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Book Note: Natural Law In Court: A History Of Legal Theory In Practice,
by R. H. Helmolz
Abstract
AFTER THE FALL OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM, the German legal theorist and former Minister of Justice
Gustav Radbruch famously wrote “[w]here there is not even an attempt at justice, where equality, the core of
justice, is deliberately betrayed in the issuance of positive law, then the statute is not merely ‘flawed law’, it
lacks completely the very nature of law.”2 For Radbruch, courts needed to have in certain circumstances
recourse to principles of justice beyond those available in the written statute; a kind of natural law. Radbruch’s
call for an application of natural law at court evokes the central question in R. H. Helmholz’s latest book,
Natural Law In Court: A History of Legal Theory in Practice3: has the law of nature ever had any real bearing
on the growth of the substantive law in the West? To answer this question, Helmholz places great emphasis on
the history of court process, with a consideration of cases from Europe, England, and the United States
spanning from the early modern period to the nineteenth century. Rather than relying on individual writers
on natural law—a subject already well-canvassed in the literature4—Helmholz limits his investigation to legal
education in each of these jurisdictions and its application at court.
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Natural Law In Court: A History Of Legal 
Theory In Practice, by R. H. Helmholz1
ADAM GIANCOLA
AFTER THE FALL OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM, the German legal theorist and former 
Minister of Justice Gustav Radbruch famously wrote “[w]here there is not even 
an attempt at justice, where equality, the core of justice, is deliberately betrayed 
in the issuance of positive law, then the statute is not merely ‘flawed law’, it lacks 
completely the very nature of law.”2 For Radbruch, courts needed to have in 
certain circumstances recourse to principles of justice beyond those available in 
the written statute; a kind of natural law.
Radbruch’s call for an application of natural law at court evokes the central 
question in R. H. Helmholz’s latest book, Natural Law In Court: A History of 
Legal Theory in Practice3: has the law of nature ever had any real bearing on the 
growth of the substantive law in the West? To answer this question, Helmholz 
places great emphasis on the history of court process, with a consideration of cases 
from Europe, England, and the United States spanning from the early modern 
period to the nineteenth century. Rather than relying on individual writers on 
natural law—a subject already well-canvassed in the literature4—Helmholz 
1. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2015) 260 pages.
2. Gustav Radbruch, Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law (1946), translated by Bonnie 
Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L Paulson (2006) 26:1 OJLS 1 at 7.
3. Supra note 1.
4. See e.g., Natural Law: Historical, Systematic and Juridical Approaches, eds., Alejandro 
N García, Mario Šilar & José M Torralba (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2008).
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limits his investigation to legal education in each of these jurisdictions and its 
application at court.
Chapter one provides a survey of the foundations of legal education in 
continental Europe. Helmholz outlines the sources and pedagogies that were 
frequently employed in the medieval universities to introduce students of the 
law to the ius commune—the body of common law derived from both Roman 
and canonical jurisprudence that made up the legal system on the Continent. 
It was within the ius commune that students of the law were exposed to numerous 
articulations of the law of nature, the guiding framework against which all 
positive law was to be measured.
In chapter two, Helmholz looks at the practical applications of European 
legal education and the imparting of the natural law on actual cases. He uses 
a wide selection of decisiones and consilia from the fifteenth to the eighteenth 
century alongside treatises and other regional sources. Helmholz discusses 
a number of areas of the law where natural law made a regular appearance, 
including in procedural law, the law of family and succession, criminal law, 
commercial and economic regulation, statutory interpretation, and restraints on 
the exercise of power.
In chapter three, Helmholz briefly details the English model of legal 
education which, unlike on the Continent, did not begin with the glosses of 
Roman and canon law sources. Nevertheless, Helmholz raises evidence of natural 
law jurisprudence, despite its seemingly narrower application. In chapter four, 
Helmholz reviews numerous English cases in which the law of nature is found to 
emerge in both specific and unexpected places.
Chapter five brings Helmholz’s historical analysis to the United States. 
He gives an overview of the many legal treatises written from the time of American 
independence up until the middle of the nineteenth century that circulated 
within the first U.S. law schools—a number of which made direct reference to 
the law of nature as a legitimate source of law. In chapter six, Helmholz puts forth 
evidence of the natural law’s inspiration at all levels of the American courts and 
in a variety of legal subjects.
The significance of this book’s contribution to the legal literature should not 
be confined to its historical findings. Rather than limiting the scope of the book 
to the question of whether lawyers and the parties they represented actually relied 
upon the law of nature at court, Helmholz urges his readers to consider the more 
pressing question: Did natural law make a difference? To this question Helmholz’s 
answer is in the affirmative, but still one that leaves room for open debate and 
further pondering. Perhaps most important, his use of history profoundly shifts 
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the existing conversation about natural law theory5—and for this, his effort is 
commendable. Helmholz aptly describes this shift: “For lawyers educated in 
those early centuries, the dictates of the law of nature were not platitudes. They 
were not theory. They were living law.”6 
5. Despite the fact that natural law theory no longer occupies the dominant position it once did 
among lawyers, it still has its current defenders. See for example the works of John Finnis, 
Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and Robert George.
6. Supra note 1 at 40.
